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ARTICLES
"You have it in your power to make the dream of a more
human world order under law come true"
ADDRESS TO THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Benjamin B. Ferencz (Rome, 16 June 1998)
I have to come to Rome to speak for those who can-
not speak - the silent victims of monstrous deeds. The only
authorization I have comes from my heart.
Over fifty years ago, I stood in a courtroom at Nuremberg
and accused twenty-two high-ranking German Storm Troopers
of deliberately murdering more than a million men, women and
children. The defenseless victims were slaughtered because
they did not share the race or creed of their executioners. I
asked the tribunal to affirm the legal right of every human be-
ing to live in peace and dignity. It was a plea of humanity to
law - a plea that needs repeating.
Unanimous affirmation of the Nuremberg principles by the
United Nations in 1947 implied a promise that "never again"
would aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity go
unpunished. War crimes trials after World War II came to
grips with the past. We have yet to come to grips with the
future.
I have come to Rome to plead for a more humane
world order. Nuremberg was the beginning of a process. Fail-
ure to build on its precedents has cost the world dearly. Once
the political will was aroused, the Security Council was able-in
1993 and 1994-to establish competent criminal courts quickly to
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bring perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity in
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to trial. But limited ad hoc
courts created after the event is hardly the best way to ensure
universal justice. A permanent court is needed for permanent
deterrence. The time for decisive compromise has come. Now
the challenge is in your hands. Outmoded traditions of State
sovereignty must not derail the forward movement. National
power and privilege must take account of international needs.
We all share one interdependent planet, linked by new net-
works of instant communication. No nation and no person can
feel secure until all are secure. The silent voices of "We the Peo-
ples" - who are the true sovereigns of today - cry out for enforce-
able law to protect the universal human interest. You have it in
your power to make the dream of a more human world order
under law come true.
I have come to Rome to speak for peace. Ever since
the judgment at Nuremberg, it has been undeniable that ag-
gressive war is not a national right but an international crime.
War is the soil from which the worst human rights violations
invariably grow. The UN Charter prescribes that only the Se-
curity Council can determine when aggression by a state has
occurred but it makes no provision for criminal trials. No crimi-
nal statute can expand or diminish the Council's vested power.
Only an independent court can decide justly whether any indi-
vidual is innocent or guilty. Excluding aggression from interna-
tional judicial scrutiny is to grant immunity to those
responsible for "the supreme international crime" - omission en-
courages war rather than peace.
Carefully selected judges and prosecutors, subject to super-
vision, public scrutiny and budgetary controls, provide ade-
quate guarantees that they will not betray their trust. They
must be given the authority and the tools to do their difficult
job. The certainty of punishment can be a powerful deterrent.
To condemn crime yet provide no institution able to convict the
guilty is to mock the victims and encourage dangerous unrest.
Human rights must prevail over human wrongs. International
law must prevail over international crime.
I have come to Rome to encourage your noble efforts.
A great deal more needs to be done before the causes of interna-
tional crimes are removed. But one thing is sure - without clear
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international laws, courts and effective enforcement there can
be no deterrence, no justice and no world peace. Justice, recon-
ciliation and rehabilitation are needed to bind up the wounds of
humankind.
Hope is the engine that drives human endeavor. It gener-
ates the energy needed to achieve the difficult goals that lie
ahead. Never lose faith that the dreams of today for a more
lawful world can become the reality of tomorrow. Never stop
trying to make this a more humane universe. If we care enough
and dare enough, an international criminal court - the missing
link in the world legal order - is within our grasp. The place to
act is here and time to act is now!
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CAN AGGRESSION BE DETERRED
BY LAW?
Benjamin B. Ferencz1
THE VISION OF NUREMBERG IN 1945: WORLD PEACE THROUGH
WORLD LAW
At the end of the Second World War, one of the important
goals of the victorious allied powers was to make international
law effective to help maintain world peace. The illegal inva-
sions and atrocities perpetrated by the Hitler regime were so
outrageous that the temptation was great simply to arrest Nazi
leaders and have them shot. This, in fact, was an early British
proposal that probably would have been approved by Stalin, but
was not acceptable to the United States. Contrary to some pop-
ular misconceptions, war-crimes trials were never intended as
victor's vengeance over a vanquished foe. The leading juridical
architect of the trials, highly respected Justice Robert M. Jack-
son, on leave from the Supreme Court to become America's
Chief Prosecutor, reaffirmed the rule of law as he opened the
trial before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nu-
remberg in 1945: "That four great nations, flushed with victory
and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and volunta-
rily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is
one of the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to
Reason."2
The Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter) pro-
claimed the goals of saving succeeding generations from the
1 J.D. Harvard 1943. Benjamin Ferencz was a Prosecutor at the Nuremberg
Trials. Highly published, one of his books based on Jewish forced labor in Nazi
concentration camps has been used as a basis for the right to reparations. Another
book dealt extensively with U.N. efforts to reach consensus on a definition of ag-
gression. He has also ceaselessly advocated the establishment of a permanent in-
ternational criminal court. In May 1999, Benjamin Ferencz received the degree of
Doctor of Laws, honoris causa, from Iona College. Aside from remaining a forceful
advocate for a permanent International Criminal Court, he is an Adjunct Professor
at Pace University School of Law.
2 1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 437 (1975)
[hereinafter FERENCZ, AGGRESSION].
[Vol. 11:341
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/3
1999] CAN AGGRESSION BE DETERRED BY LAW? 345
scourge of war, promoting human rights, justice and respect for
international law. The Nuremberg trials were a cornerstone of
the great effort to make the peace more secure. In Jackson's
view, it was high time "to make war less attractive to those who
held the destiny of peoples in their power,"3 and the way to pro-
tect people from domestic tyranny, violence and aggression was
to make all men responsible to law and to make sure that those
who start a war will pay for it personally. 4 It was repeatedly
confirmed by Nuremberg prosecutors and judges that the stan-
dards imposed on the German defendants were equally applica-
ble to officials of the Allied Powers and to those of all nations.
"To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice" said Jackson, "is
to put it to our own lips as well."5
Outstanding jurists from the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and
France, meeting in London in 1945, listed only three types of
crimes that would come within the jurisdiction of the IMT. The
first-which is the subject of this article-was "Crimes Against
Peace: namely planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing."6 De-
fendants could be found guilty of that crime only if it was
proved that they were leaders or accomplices who had personal
knowledge that aggression was contemplated and had helped to
plan or wage the crime of aggressive war. Exactly what was
meant by aggression or aggressive war was not set forth. Jack-
son argued that the actions of the Nazi leaders were unambigu-
ously aggressive when considered in the light of a multilateral
1933 convention on that subject and legal opinions that had al-
ready been well crystallized. 7
In its carefully reasoned final judgment, the distinguished
judges who sat on the IMT bench concluded that the London
Charter was not ex post facto legislation but an expression of
existing international law. Past legal precedents and treaties,
that were cited in detail, had put the defendants on notice that
3 Id. at 450.
4 See id.
5 Id. at 439.
6 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, art. 6, 59
Stat. 1547.
7 See FERENCZ, AGGRESSION, supra note 2, at 446.
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what they were doing was criminal. Justice demanded that
they be punished.8 "Only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be en-
forced."9 High officials of the German Reich were executed for
the crime of aggression, which the tribunal, after extensive
analysis, condemned as "the supreme international crime differ-
ing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself
the accumulated evil of the whole." 10
Following the IMT trial, the United States conducted a
dozen subsequent war-crimes trials at Nuremberg under the di-
rection of General Telford Taylor, a Harvard Law School gradu-
ate who later became a Professor of International Law at
Columbia and Yeshiva universities in New York. These trials
were based on the London Charter for the IMT, as well as a
clarifying law that added invasions as a crime against peace
and noted that the listing was not exclusive.11
Despite the absence of detailed definitions and rules of pro-
cedure, the fact that the Nuremberg proceedings were open to
the public, that all defendants could choose their own counsel
and receive the usual benefits of fair trial, confirmed the valid-
ity of the judicial findings. The fairness of the Nuremberg trials
has been widely acknowledged. They served as models for war-
crimes trials in Tokyo and other parts of the world. Telford
Taylor shared the conviction of his predecessor Justice Jackson
that law must apply equally to everyone. He too, was convinced
that the greatest achievement of Nuremberg was the condem-
nation of aggressive war since the most heinous crime was war-
making itself.1 2
JUMPING THE FIRST HURDLE: AGGRESSION DEFINED BY
CONSENSUS IN 1974
The validity of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment was
unanimously affirmed by the General Assembly of the United
8 See id. at 479-481.
9 Id. at 81.
10 Id. at 452.
11 See Control Council Law No. 10 reprinted in FERENCZ, AGGRESSION, supra
note 2, at 491-496.
12 See TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 64-66. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, Telford Taylor, Pioneer of In-
ternational Law, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 662 (1999).
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Nations (U.N.) in 1946.13 U.N. Committees were appointed to
prepare both a code of international crimes based on the Nu-
remberg principles and to draft the statute for a new interna-
tional criminal tribunal that could enforce the penal code. It
soon became apparent that political rivalries between the major
powers made consensus agreements impossible. It was argued
that without a clear definition of the crime of aggression, no
criminal code would be complete, and as long as there was no
code, there was no need for a court to enforce it. Thus every-
thing was linked, and progress was stymied, with the weak ex-
cuse that the time was not yet ripe. In the meanwhile, nations
went back to killing as usual.
After more than a quarter-of-a-century of fruitless wran-
gling, a definition of aggression was reached by consensus in
1974. It condemned the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State and, after listing several illustrations of prohib-
ited actions, concluded that whether the crime of aggression
had been committed had to be considered "in the light of all the
circumstances of each particular case."14 The final decision was
left to the Security Council since, under the U.N. Charter, the
Council bore primary responsibility for determining whether
aggression by a State had occurred. 15 As with many U.N. reso-
lutions, in order to reach agreement, it became necessary to in-
clude several ambiguous phrases that nations might interpret
for their own advantage. 16
The existence of the definition removed the artificial barrier
that had been used as the excuse to defer action on the criminal
code and court. The International Law Commission (ILC), a
U.N.-related body of thirty-four independent legal experts from
various regions of the world, resumed deliberations on the Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court and a Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Progress in
building on the Nuremberg legal foundations was labored and
13 See G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, iPt Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc A/Res/95 (1946).
14 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 2 9 th Sess., Annex para. 10, Supp. No.
31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
15 See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
16 See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 14, at Definition of Aggression. See generally
Benjamin B. Ferencz, The UN Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve or Sub-
stance?, 10 J. INT'L & ECON. 701 (1975).
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slow. But unanticipated intervening events produced a dra-
matic demonstration that international criminal tribunals were
needed and could be created quickly once the political will to act
was aroused.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES CHARGE: INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS A LA CARTE
The International Court of Justice, sitting in the Hague
and often referred to as the World Court, has roots going back to
the first World War. According to its Statute (which is very dif-
ficult to amend) it can deal only with legal disputes between
consenting States. It has no authority to hear criminal charges
against individuals. Before Nuremberg, heads of sovereign
States were traditionally considered to be immune from legal
process. What was still missing was a new legal institution to
close a gap in the existing international legal order.
Around 1991, armed violence between rival nationalistic
and ethnic groups erupted in former Yugoslavia accompanied
by widely publicized mass rapes and so-called "ethnic cleansing"
bordering on genocide. Unable or unwilling to risk their own
troops to halt the carnage, major powers, in response to public
outrage, decided to create a special international criminal court
to bring to trial those deemed responsible for the outrageous
war-crimes and crimes against humanity. In a matter of weeks,
it was possible for the Security Council to lay the foundation for
an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) that would sit in the Hague and be empowered to bring
violators to justice. 17 When acts of genocide erupted in Rwanda
in 1994, the Security Council again responded promptly by cre-
ating a similar International Criminal Court for Rwanda
(ICTR).18
Despite initial organizational and continuing enforcement
problems, both the ICTY and the ICTR have been functioning
17 See generally VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(1995).
18 See generally VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998). Aggression did not seem to be an
issue in the internal strifes of Yugoslavia or Rwanda, and that crime was not in-
cluded in the jurisdiction of the ad hoc penal courts.
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with relative effectiveness since their creation. These tribunals
demonstrated that it is feasible for the Security Council, acting
under its U.N. Charter authority to create subsidiary organs, to
establish ad hoc criminal tribunals quickly. 19 To be sure, tem-
porary courts created by the Council after massive crimes have
occurred, with only limited jurisdiction to try a limited category
of crimes in a limited area during a limited period, is not the
most effective way to ensure universal justice. Such courts are
certainly better than nothing, and they need and deserve all the
support they can get, but the international community can
hardly be expected to set up franchised criminal courts every
time major atrocities occur around the globe. The need for a
permanent international criminal court with a broader man-
date, that might deter such crimes before they are committed,
became increasingly apparent.
A PROBLEM UNRESOLVED: SUPREME CRIME LACKS A
SUPREME COURT
Prodded by the U.N. General Assembly, the ILC, in 1996
finally completed its draft Code of Crimes to supplement the
Statutes that had been drafted two years earlier for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). The statute described "the crime
of aggression" as a "customary law crime." The distinguished
lawyers on the ILC described aggression as a peremptory norm
binding on all states and, without specifying any more detailed
definition, advised that it should be left to practice to determine
the exact contours of the crime. 20 The Code upheld the Nurem-
berg principles and confirmed that crimes against peace were
punishable under international law. 21
The ILC Commentary to the Draft Code dealt in considera-
ble detail with the crime of aggression for purposes of individual
criminal responsibility. It noted that "[a] State can commit ag-
gression only with the active participation of the individuals
who have the necessary authority or power to plan, prepare, ini-
19 See U.N. CHARTER art. 29.
20 See Report of the ILC, U.N. GAOR, 51't Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 15, U.N. Doc
A/51/10 (1996).
21 The other crimes, including serious violations of the laws applicable to
armed conflict, crimes against humanity and certain crimes widely condemned by
international treaties, are outside the scope of this article.
19991
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tiate or wage aggression." 22 Aggression by a State was stated to
be a sine qua non condition for the attribution of individual
criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. 23 Since Arti-
cle 39 of the U.N. Charter vested the Security Council with pri-
mary authority to determine the existence of an act of
aggression, the ILC Statute made plain that no complaint of ag-
gression could be brought unless the Security Council first de-
termined that a State had committed the act of aggression
which was the subject of the complaint.
The absence of a more specific definition of aggression and
the reference to the Security Council in the ILC recommenda-
tions, was supportive of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment
that had been affirmed by the entire General Assembly in 1946.
Nevertheless, those two points gave rise to major differences
when nations convened to consider a permanent criminal court.
As the General Assembly had recommended, the ILC drafts
formed the basis for consideration by open-ended U.N. Commit-
tees preparing the foundation for a permanent international
criminal court. By 1996, much of the earlier opposition to the
idea of a permanent international criminal court seemed to
have disappeared. U.S. President William Clinton appeared
before the General Assembly of the U.N. on 22 September 1997
to call for a permanent international criminal court before the
century ends. He had earlier publicly pledged support for the
principles of Nuremberg, and Secretary of State Madeleine Al-
bright had made many similar statements. But the powerful
United States, often called upon for military interventions that
it perceived to be justifiable on humanitarian grounds, showed
little enthusiasm for including the crime of aggression within
the jurisdiction of the planned new court. Smaller nations re-
sented the privileged veto power reserved to the five permanent
members of the Security Council and they opposed any depen-
dence of the ICC on a Council that many regarded as politicized
and self-serving.
When the final plenipotentiary negotiating sessions began
in Rome in the summer of 1998, most states, including the Eu-
ropean Union and about 30 nations united in the Non-Aligned
22 Report of the ILC, supra note 20, at 84.
23 See id. at 85. See also Report of the ILC, U.N. GAOR, 49' Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994).
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Movement, insisted that without the inclusion of aggression as
a crime they would be unable to support the new court. Many
Arab states wanted the 1974 consensus definition, with possibly
some improvements in their favor, included in the ICC Statute.
Germany's delegate, Dr. Hans-Peter Kaul, pressed various com-
promise solutions. India and Pakistan, busy testing new nu-
clear weapons, were not inclined to subject themselves to
possible charges of aggression. China stressed the protection of
its national sovereignty. The U.S., mindful of military and
political considerations, remained aloof on the question of in-
cluding aggression and insisted on preserving the Security
Council's veto rights as guaranteed by the U.N. Charter. A host
of real or politically motivated concerns about including aggres-
sion that had been voiced during earlier meetings remained un-
altered. 24 There simply was not enough time in Rome to reach
agreement on these sensitive questions. In the end, the agile
and adroit Chairman Philippe Kirsch of Canada found the only
compromise possible: the resolution of the differences was post-
poned to a later day.
When, despite U.S. objections on many points, the Rome
Statute was overwhelmingly endorsed by a vote of 120 to 7 and
21 abstentions, all that could be agreed upon concerning the in-
clusion of the crime of aggression was that it was recognized as
an international crime subject to the Court's jurisdiction. But
that was only the first step. The second step, allowing the
Court to act, could only be taken after certain conditions were
met. There had to be a near-consensus agreement on a defini-
tion of aggression and the relationship between the ICC and the
Security Council had to be clarified, consistent with the U.N.
Charter. As a third and final step, the proposed new definition
and clarification could only be considered for adoption at an
amendment conference that could not take place until more
than seven years had elapsed after the Statute had gone into
effect by being ratified by at least sixty nations.25 When, and if,
all of those conditions could be met, was rather uncertain.
24 See ICC Preparatory Commission Reports Aug. 1996, Vol. 1 and Feb. 21,
1997.
25 See Rome Statute, A/Conf.183/9, 17 July 1998, arts. 5, 121, 123, 126.
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THE IMMEDIATE GOALs: RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
The primary and most urgent goal, of course, must be to
obtain the sixty ratifications without which the Rome Treaty
cannot come into effect. 26 This will require new legislation and
even constitutional amendments in many countries. The pro-
cess is now under way at various national levels. Reasonable
estimates indicate that it will still take at least several years
before all the necessary ratifications are attained.
A Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) is in the midst of a
series of meetings designed to carry out certain implementing
requirements that must be in place before the ICC can begin
operations. Rules of Procedure and Evidence and specifying the
Elements of Crimes that must be proved to obtain convictions
must be finalized before 30 June 2000. How the ICC will be
financed in the short and long term must also be resolved and
other technical arrangements must be made before an Assem-
bly of State Parties can take over supervisory responsibilities
for the Court and the Commission disbanded. 27 Nations that
may not have signed the Treaty, such as the United States, are
participating in the negotiations at the U.N., trying to shape
the proceedings in ways that may be generally acceptable even
though it is mandated that the Rome Statute cannot be sub-
stantively modified or subjected to any reservations. 28
The Commission was also directed to prepare proposals for
a provision on aggression and its elements and the conditions
under which the ICC could exercise jurisdiction with regard to
that crime. A coordinator, Tuvako Manongi of Tanzania, was
appointed to sound out the delegates. A compilation of proposals
regarding aggression, including new papers by eight Arab
states, the Russian Federation and Germany, was put on the
table. 29 On 2 August 1999, twenty-two delegates spoke up in a
26 See id. art. 126.
27 See U.N. Res. F, U.N. GAOR, 53' Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 153, at 3-4,
U.N. Doc. A/53/387 (1998).
28 See Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 120.
29 See generally Compilation of Proposals on the Crime of Aggression Submit-
ted at the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court (1996-1998), the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Internaitonal Criminal Court (1998)
and the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (1999),
Prep. Comm. For the I.C.C., U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/INF/2 (1999).
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debate on the subject. It was clear that there remained a wide
diversity of views. Some urged that a working group be ap-
pointed to deal with the matter further. Australia noted the re-
ality that, given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject,
reaching agreement would take time and priority should be
given to the other issues that had an early deadline. 30 What to
do about aggression remained unresolved, and was left for fur-
ther consideration at the next session of the PrepCom at the
end of 1999.
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? A COMPROMISE SOLUTION
Let us consider the alternatives now faced by the interna-
tional community:
(1) Beginning at the most negative end of the spectrum, let
us assume that no agreement can be reached on an acceptable
definition of aggression or the role of the Security Council in
relationship to the proposed ICC. If that happens, the ICC, as
proposed by the Rome Statute, will have no jurisdiction to deal
with the crime of aggression. If past experience is any guide, it
is most likely that heads of state and other leaders responsible
for "the supreme international crime" will remain immune from
prosecution. 31 Impunity can hardly be a deterrent to despots
contemplating future acts of aggression.
(2) Absence of an international criminal jurisdiction does
not necessarily mean that the perpetrators will escape punish-
ment completely. If the aggressor is defeated, the guilty party
may still be tried by the victor or by a new national government
should the wrongdoing state have been replaced. Standards of
fair trial may, or may not, be applied, depending upon the do-
mestic law and practices of the state concerned.
(3) The criminal may also be brought to trial by an ad hoc
tribunal created at some future date by the Security Council.
Such U.N. tribunals are under consideration in addition to the
existing ICTY and ICTR and the possibility of expansion along
those lines should not be ruled out.
30 ICC Preparatory Commission Press Release L/2931. 2 and 6 Aug. 1999.
31 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Nuremberg Principles and the Gulf War, 66
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 711 (1992).
1999]
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(4) An international criminal court based on the Rome
Statute, focusing on crimes of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole and acquiring jurisdiction only when na-
tional States are unable or unwilling to try the offenders in a
fair trial, can try the accused in a public forum directed by care-
fully selected judges under the supervision and effective control
of the international community.
It has long been an established principle of criminal law
that if crime is to be deterred, the wrongdoers should know in
advance that punishment will be swift and certain. If one con-
siders the alternatives listed, it will be clear that alternative
four is most likely to produce the desired result. The Rome
Statute seems an infinitely better way to proceed to a system of
international justice than any other available choice.
If one recalls that it took nations at least several decades to
reach the 1974 consensus definition of aggression, and that it
was a finely balanced document in which every word was care-
fully weighed, the prospects for being able, in a reasonable pe-
riod of time, to reach agreement on a new definition by
consensus do not appear very bright. If one adds the require-
ment that the relationship between the ICC and Security Coun-
cil must also be clarified to assure the independence of the
Court, while remaining consistent with the Charter, it might
appear that nations now face a "mission impossible." But, with
some creative legal imagination, perhaps a solution may be
found. If acceptable new compromises seem very time-consum-
ing or impossible, why not simply accept what has already been
accepted and perhaps add a few undisputed clauses that may
help to assuage the legitimate concerns of those who have hesi-
tated to take a bold step forward? It can be done.
Let us begin by accepting the definition of aggression al-
ready approved by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314 in
1974. True, it has its defects and some states would like
changes, but the fact is that it has already been approved and
accepted and it is most unlikely that significant changes can be
adopted quickly by all parties to the Rome Statute. The most
frequently voiced objection to accepting the 1974 definition of
aggression now is that it was intended only as a non-binding
guide to the Security Council (that paid practically no attention
to it thereafter) and that it is not suitable in a criminal statute
[Vol. 11:341
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that, in fairness, must specify the elements of the crime. These
objections are not well founded.
During the many years of debate by special U.N. commit-
tees, representative of all nations, no one ever suggested that
the definition was to have only a very restricted and limited sig-
nificance. The definition of aggression was intended as a defini-
tion of the crime of aggression! Its preamble said specifically
that the definition was intended to deter a potential aggressor.
The agreed definition specifically stated: "A war of aggression is
a crime against international peace."32 The consensus was con-
sistent with the original General Assembly mandate based on
the Nuremberg principles. The elements of mens rea, or guilty
knowledge, flowed from the position of the defendants as impor-
tant leaders. They could only be indicted for the crime if their
knowledge, capacity and authority were made clear from the
very nature of their authority. These criminal provisions and
elements were considered adequate by the Prosecution and
Tribunals at Nuremberg, affirmed by the entire General Assem-
bly, recommended by the ILC and a host of independent experts
and a worldwide public that recognized the fairness of the Nu-
remberg trials. Surely, it should be possible, by way of compro-
mise, for nations to accept what has already been so universally
accepted.
The relationship between an independent Court and Secur-
ity Council can also be resolved. It is the U.N. Charter that de-
termines the role and authority of the Council. All members of
the U.N. are legally bound by the Charter they have freely ac-
cepted. The Charter cannot be altered by any criminal statute.
It can be changed only by amendment of the Charter itself, in
accordance with its terms. Since the five permanent members
would have to consent to any amendment, that possibility is
clearly not in the cards at this time. True, the Charter provi-
sions giving only five nations special veto rights are manifestly
unfair, but they were accepted for vital political reasons without
which the U.N. probably would not have come into existence.
The time may come when privileged members will recognize the
value of voluntarily restraining their unjust veto power, but the
Rome Statute cannot diminish the Council's authority nor its
32 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 14, art. 5(2).
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Charter obligation to determine when aggression by a State has
occurred. The concerns that the Council will act unfairly may
perhaps be met by other means.
Article 1 of the U.N. Charter sets forth the goal of sup-
pressing acts of aggression "in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law."33 All members of the Security
Council are bound by that mandate. Should a State member of
the Council be accused of aggression and its representative on
the Council fail to recuse himself from consideration or voting
on the matter (as is customary) that would seem to be not in
conformity with principles of justice. Under those circum-
stances, perhaps ICC judges might be justified in disregarding
an improper Security Council resolution. To give the ICC this
possibility, it would be helpful to insert the cited clause into a
compromise amendment regarding the crime of aggression.
If, as is suggested by those who fear a biased Council, the
ICC were to bypass the Council's duty to determine when ag-
gression by a State has occurred, it would almost surely encoun-
ter the argument from the defendant that the Court was
usurping the Council's Charter authority and was acting
outside its own judicial competence. Even a guilty defendant
might thereby escape punishment, and the prospects of deter-
rence of war through law would be diminished rather than
enhanced.
Any proposed amendment that can quickly attain general
acceptance (and several have been put forth by various coun-
tries) would be an advance over the current stalemate. If such
agreement cannot be reached fairly soon however, another al-
ternative should merit consideration: Nations that are deter-
mined to bring aggression under international legal control
should be ready to endorse the provisions that have already
been universally accepted verbatim or in principle. The defini-
tion of aggression can then be put to rest and the ICC would
have authority to act on aggression as soon as the amendment
has been passed by the requisite number of votes as required by
the Rome Statute. The suggested text of such an amendment is
attached as an Annex hereto.
33 U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
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CONCLUSION: THERE'S ALWAYS HOPE
The solution here suggested is certainly not the last word.
Other creative solutions are surely possible. No one can believe
that competent lawyers are unable to reach agreement on what
constitutes the crime of aggression and how its cruel perpetra-
tors may be brought to account. But there is no need to try to
spell out in advance every possible contingency and expect over
188 countries with different standards and cultures to agree on
every word. Law is constantly changing to meet the needs of a
changing world society. ICC Judges must be trusted to judge
fairly according to the circumstances and conditions before
them.
International law is slowly evolving as nations crawl to-
ward a more humane world order. Notions of absolute State
sovereignty and traditional prohibitions against interference in
a country's internal affairs are still heard as justification for
massive violations of human rights. The line between aggres-
sion and humanitarian intervention has not yet been clearly
drawn. Nor are the parameters of self-defense sharply defined.
Lawful goals can only be sought by lawful means, but where the
law itself is unclear, it is understandable that powerful nations
may hesitate to subject their leaders to the uncertainties of an
untried international penal tribunal. In the thermonuclear age,
with instant planetary communications, the risks of uncon-
trolled self-help are far more hazardous than the risk of ac-
cepting binding legal obligations to maintain peace. Powerful
states should recall the grandeur of past empires that have
turned to dust and put their faith in law rather than war. New
thinking will be needed and new institutions created to enforce
international law collectively on behalf of all. That is what the
ICC is all about.34
One must have confidence that highly qualified jurists who
have been carefully selected will be able to render wise deci-
34 See generally BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, NEW LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR GLOBAL
SURVIVAL (1994). See also recent publications dealing with the Rome Statute: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (Roy Lee
ed., 1999); 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d. ed. 1999);
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - ESSAYS IN HONOR OF AD-
RIAAN Bos (H. von Hebel et. al. eds., 1999); COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
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sions based on a fair interpretation of the Statute. This point
has been repeatedly stressed by former Nuremberg lawyers and
Judges of the ad hoc tribunals created by the Security Council.
Experience shows that such learned and competent persons will
honor their mandates. They are subject to a wide variety of con-
trols, from appellate proceedings to supervision by the Assem-
bly of States, and to budgetary restraints and removals, should
they fail in their duty. The ICC, with no independent enforce-
ment powers, is dependent upon the good will of nations to see
that Court decisions are accepted. Respect for the court and its
effectiveness can only be maintained if the judges perform their
duties faithfully and well on behalf of world peace.
Nations must decide which of the listed alternatives they
prefer. Surely small nations and those who do not contemplate
acts of aggression have much to gain by creating an interna-
tional system to help curb a terrible crime that is the breeding
ground for the most atrocious crimes against humanity.
Whether aggression can be deterred by law depends upon the
willingness of states to change their way of thinking and acting.
No one expects perfection but the enforcement of criminal law is
still regarded as a useful tool for the benefit of humankind.
As we enter a new millennium, decision-makers must real-
ize that the practices and slogans of the past must give way to a
new humanity, which recognizes the sovereignty of the individ-
ual as the guiding norm of international society. At the U.N.
and in international conferences throughout the world, states-
men and nongovernmental organizations are beginning to
speak about a "culture of peace." They have come to recognize
that the right to live in peace is the most fundamental human
right. The war-ethic that steeped past generations in wasted
human blood and misery must be replaced by a "peace-ethic," in
which aggression is properly condemned as the supreme inter-
national crime. Those who are responsible for incalculable
harm to innocent victims of aggression must know that they
will answer for their evil deeds before the bar of international
justice. When such a needed system of international controls is
finally put in place and its decisions fairly enforced, one can
hope that wars of aggression can be deterred and the world will
become a more humane and peaceful place for everyone.
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ANNEX
Amendment of the Rome Statute to Bring Aggression
Within ICC's Jurisdiction
In the exercise of its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
pursuant to Article 5- 1(d) and 2, the following provisions,
adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123, shall apply:
For the purpose of this Statute, aggression shall be de-
fined as set forth in General Assembly Resolution 3314
(XXX) on 14 December 1974.
No complaint of aggression may be brought under this
statute unless the Security Council has first determined,
in conformity with the principles of justice and interna-
tional law as laid down in Article 1 of the Charter of the
United Nations, that a State has committed the act of ag-
gression which is the subject of the complaint.*
An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively par-
ticipates in or orders the planning, preparation, initia-
tion or waging of aggression committed by a State shall
be responsible for the crime of aggression.**
The Court shall be completely independent in determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused.
COMMENTARY
The Proposed amendment upholds the 1974 GA consensus
definition, the Judgment and Charter of the Nuremberg and To-
kyo tribunals, the consensus recommendations of the Interna-
tional Law Commission as well as relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations. The last sentence emphasizes
the independence of the ICC.
The UN Charter (Article 39), GA Resolution 3314 (Art.4)
and the ILC all confirm the primary authority of the Security
Council to determine whether aggression by a State has oc-
* I.L.C. Consensus Draft Statute for ICC, U.N. GAOR, 4 9 th Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 84, art.23(2), U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) (except for reference to principles of
justice and law).
** I.L.C. Consensus Draft Code of Crimes, U.N. GAOR, 51t Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 83, art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/51110 (1996).
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curred. Reference to the principles of justice and international
law has been added to stress the Council's legal obligation as
specifically prescribed in the UN Charter. Limiting criminal
culpability to those individuals who occupied high positions of
responsibility confirms the Nuremberg principles and adds the
necessary elements required by criminal law.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/3
